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IN THE UNITEU STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANN B. HOPKINS,
Plaintiff,
v.

PRICE WATERHOUSE,
Defendant.
_______ _______
_____

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No. 84-3040
(GAG)

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT ON REMEDIAL ISSUES
1.

Plaintiff is a management consultant who

specializes in diagnosing and solving problems in the area of
"big computer systems."

1990 Tr. at 35.1/

Plaintiff was

employed in that capacity in Price Waterhouse's Office of
Government Services ("OGS") in Washington, D.C., from August
1978 to January 1984.
2.

Def. Ex. 4; 1990 Tr. at 31.

Plaintiff was informed in late March 1983 that

her candidacy for partnership in the Price Waterhouse firm
would be deferred, or "held,• for one year.
3.

1990 Tr. at 29.

In April 1983, shortly after learning that her

partnership candidacy had been placed on hold, plaintiff met
with the Chairman and Senior Partner of Price Waterhouse,
Joseph E. Connor, to discuss the reasons for the firm's
decision to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy and her
future prospects at the firm.

1985 Deposition of Joseph E.

1/ The transcript of the February 28, 1990-March 1, 1990 trial
on remand shall be cited herein as •1990 Tr.,• and the
transcript of the March 1985 trial shall be cited at •1905 Tr."

.

.'

Connor ("1985 Connor Dep.") at 38.

In that conversation,

Mr. Connor discussed with plaintiff her problems in dealing
with subordinates and colleagues and, in particular, conveyed
his disappointment that many of the most serious criticisms of
plaintiff came from partners that he regarded highly, who were
generally viewed as "balanced graders," and who "represented a
formidable aggregation of partners whose standing with rest of
the partners and with the Policy Board was very high."
at 57.

Id.

Mr. Connor stressed the need for plaintiff to come to

terms with and resolve her interpersonal deficiencies.

He

urged her to attempt to improve her method of working with
others in the coming year, .id, at 58, and emphasized that the
firm's decision to defer plaintiff's partnership candidacy did
not end her chances of becoming a partner, and, indeed, that
"frequently a very high percentage of holds came in the next
year."Z/

Id, at 54.
4.

A few days after her meeting with Mr. Connor,

plaintiff discussed her conversation with Mr. Connor with an
OGS partner in the Washington, D.C. office who had supported
plaintiff's 1983 partnership candidacy.

1985 Tr. at 387.

The

record reflects that plaintiff materially misrepresented the
substance of her conversation with Mr. Connor in this
conversation, implying that Mr. Connor had disparaged those

Z/ Eighty percent (16 out of 20) of the candidates held in
1983 (plaintiff's year) were eventually admitted to the
partnership. Def. Ex. 69.
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partners who did not support plaintiff's partnership candidacy
and that he had intimated that those who did not support
plaintiff the next year would be risking damage to their
relationship with him.
5.

See 1985 Tr. at 387-88, 410-11.

This incident led the partner with whom plaintiff

had this conversation to withdraw his support of plaintiff's
1984 partnership candidacy.l/

The decision of this partner and

another partner to oppose plaintiff's candidacy resulted in
OGS's decision not to repropose plaintiff for partnership in
1984.

618 F. Supp. 1109, 1115 (D.D.C. 1985).

This decision

was not tainted by any consideration of plaintiff's gender.
618 F. Supp. at 1115.

Plaintiff's own conduct, as described

above, caused the OGS decision not to repropose her for
partnership.
6.

On August 6, 1983, plaintiff was informed that

OGS had decided not to repropose her for partnership in 1984.
1990 Tr. at 29.
7.

After the August 1983 decision not to repropose

plaintiff, she was informed that OGS would again consider
proposing her for partnership the following year, Def. Ex. 48,
and that she still had a "slim chance" to be made a partner.
1985 Tr. at 112.

She was also informed that she could continue

l / This partner testified to other difficulties that he
encountered with plaintiff after the 1983 hold decision
involving her inability to deal with colleagues in an
1985 Tr. at 388-89, 410.
acceptable fashion.

-
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at Price Waterhouse as a senior manager.

Id.

S e e ~ 1990

Tr. at 30.
8.

Plaintiff voluntarily submitted her resignation

from Price Waterhouse in December 1983.

1990 Tr. at 31-32.

Her resignation was accepted on January 17, 1984.

9.

I.d_.

Plaintiff's contract with Price Waterhouse

required plaintiff to give Price Waterhouse three months notice
of her intent to resign and gave Price Waterhouse the right to
accept plaintiff's resignation immediately and terminate the
contract, provided it paid compensation to plaintiff for the
duration of the three-month notice period.
Tr. at 32.

Def. Ex. 4; 1990

Plaintiff actually was given a separation payment

of $37,812.61, the equivalent of approximately five months pay,
when the firm exercised its option to accept plaintiff's
resignation in January 1984 and terminate the contract.

1990

Tr. at 32; Def. Ex. 56.
10.

At the time of her resignation, plaintiff was

earning $70,000 per year at Price Waterhouse.

1990 Tr. at 33.

After the March 1983 hold decision, plaintiff had several
employment options with other firms that would have paid
$70,000 - $90,000 a year.

1985 Tr. at 115.

Plaintiff did not

pursue these options then or after she resigned from Price
Waterhouse.
11.

~

1990 Tr. at 34.

Prior to her resignation, plaintiff made no

effort to find a position at another accounting/consulting firm
similar to the position she sought at Price Waterhouse.
Tr. at 33.

-
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1990

12.

Plaintiff did not ask the Price Waterhouse firm

for assistance in finding a new position.
13.

1990 Tr. at 70.

Prior to leaving Price Waterhouse, plaintiff

determined to start her own consulting business and informed
colleagues of that decision on the day of her departure.
Tr. at 33; id. at 15.

1990

She decided to "devote [her] time and

energy to developing" her own management consulting business
rather than seeking a partnership or similar position at
another consulting firm .
14.

.I.d, at 15.

Plaintiff viewed the so-called "Big Eight"

accounting firms as the only organizations that could provide
opportunities and compensation similar to the opportunities and
compensation she had sought at Price Waterhouse.

1990 Tr. at

38, 39; Pl. Pretrial Br. on Remedy at 12 (filed Jan. 17,
1990).

Yet she viewed pursuing opportunities at such firms as

a "secondary set of activities• and made no effort to contact
any other Big Eight firm except for Touche Ross.
48-49.

1990 Tr. at

Her "energy and . . . time and . . . focus was on [her]

own practice.•
15.

J_g_.

at 19.

Plaintiff had been an employee at Touche Ross

prior to her employment at Price Waterhouse.

Plaintiff had

been a well regarded management consultant at Touche Ross.
1990 Tr. at 179.

-
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16.

William Beach, the Director of Touche Ross's

management consulting practice from 1976 to 1987,~/ testified
that in 1984 plaintiff contacted him regarding the availability
of consulting positions at Touche Ross.

1990 Tr. at 179.

Mr.

Beach testified that, when plaintiff raised the subject of her
returning to Touche Ross, he indicated that it was likely that
she would be able to return to Touche Ross as a manager and
that she would probably have been able to be on a "relatively
fast [partnership] track."

l_d.

at 179-81.

Plaintiff rejected

this possibility and abruptly walked out of the meeting.
17.

Id.

There was no reason why plaintiff could not have

returned to Touche Ross as a manager and, had she performed
satisfactori ly, become a partner in a relatively short period
of time.

1990 Tr. at 181.

Plaintiff's failure to make partner

at Price Waterhouse in 1983-84 would not have been a
disqualifyin g factor in Touche Ross's consideratio n of
plaintiff for a consulting position.

Id. at 182.

Nor would

her age or the fact that plaintiff had filed a lawsuit against
Price Waterhouse .
18.

.Id. at 182-83.

Plaintiff did not formally apply for a management

consulting position at any consulting or accounting firm.
Tr. at 48, 61-62.

1990

See also i_d. at 48.

~/ In 1989 Touche Ross merged with another accounting firm,
Deloitte, Haskins & Sells. Mr. Beach is now a principal in the
new entity, Deloitte & Touche.
1990 Tr. at 175.

-
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19.

Plaintiff simply "was not interested" in a

position at American Management Systems, Price Waterhouse's
principal competitor for government services contracts relating
to large computer systems.
20.

1990 Tr. at 53-55.

Plaintiff rejected the opportunity to start a

consulting practice at the accounting firm of Aaronson,
Fetridge, Weigle & Stern when she was approached in that regard
in 1987.

1990 Tr. at 55-56.
21.

Plaintiff similarly declined Pinkerton Computer

Consultants' offer of a management consulting position in
1987.

1990 Tr. at 50.
22.

In 1988, because she could not "deal with the ups

and downs of workload and cash flow" that an independent
consulting practice entails, plaintiff became an employee of
the Internationa l Bank for Reconstructio n and Development,
commonly known as the World Bank.

1990 Tr. at 25-26, 62.

She

presently holds the position of Senior Budget and Policy Review
Officer at a gross salary of $92,500 a year.
23.

I.d. at 12.

Neither plaintiff's independent consulting nor

her work at the World Bank has involved the kind of significant
or sustained large systems consulting that plaintiff had done
at Price Waterhouse or Touche Ross.
247-48.

~

1990 Tr. at 17,

Nor do they constitute positions comparable or

"substantial ly equivalent" to a Price Waterhouse partnership.
Plaintiff's independent consulting business was a new and
speculative enterprise and provided limited opportunities to

-
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take full advantag e of her big systems expertis e.
25-26, 334-36.

1990 Tr. at

Furtherm ore, plainti ff's budget officer

position at the World Bank is differen t in kind than a
partners hip in a major private consulti ng or accounti ng firm,
and does not provide similar respons ibilities , opportu nities or
risks.

Indeed, the World Bank compens ates plaintif f on a

schedule that is "very similar to the U.S. federal governm ent's
civil service pay system," based upon grade and step
increase s.
24.

1990 Tr . at 136.
Price Waterho use introduc ed the testimon y of

Joseph E. Connor, who was Chairma n and Senior Partner of Price
Waterho use U.S. Firm from 1978 to 1988 and presentl y serves as
Chairma n of Price Waterho use World Firm.

1990 Tr. at 227.

During the period plaintif f worked in the OGS office, Mr.
Connor had oversigh t respons ibility for that office.

It was

the only office whose partner- in-charg e reported directly to
Mr. Connor when he was Chairman of the firm.
at 5-6.

1985 Connor Dep.

Mr. Connor was persona lly involved in a major State

Departm ent project in which plainti ff also was involved and was
therefor e familiar with plainti ff's skills as a big systems
managem ent consulta nt.

Id. at 23-27;

~ ~

1990 Tr. at

247.

25.

Mr. Connor particip ated in and agreed with the

Policy Board's 1983 decision to defer plainti ff's partners hip
candidac y even though he was plainti ff's "most vocifero us
propone nt" on the Policy Board.

-

Id.
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26.

Based upon plaintiff's professional experience

since she left Price Waterhouse, Mr. Connor does not believe
that plaintiff could perform as a Price Waterhouse partner
today.

1990 Tr. at 247.

Based on plaintiff's description of

her experience as an independent consultant and World Bank
budget officer, plaintiff would not be in a position to handle
the complexity and size of the firm's computer system
projects.

Id. at 247-48.
27.

Requiring admission of plaintiff as a partner

would be disruptive and impractical because of plaintiff's
deficiencies technically and in her ability to deal with
colleagues and subordinates and because she would have been
forced on the partnership despite conduct that provided "ample"
justification for her failure to be advanced to partnership in
1983.

1990 Tr. at 249-50;
28.

~

618 F. Supp. at 1114.

Although plaintiff testified that she still would

like to be made a Price Waterhouse partner, 1990 Tr. at 6-7,
she has not demonstrated that such relief is practical or
appropriate in this case.
29.

Plaintiff also has requested monetary relief in

the form of back pay for the period July 1, 1983 through June
30, 1989, and, as an alternative to admission as a partner,
"front pay," including retirement benefits, for the period July
1, 1989 "to her life expectancy in 2025."

Pl. Ex. A3.

Because

Price Waterhouse has met its burden of demonstrating that
plaintiff failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages,

-
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even if plaintiff had established liability, the Court would
find that plaintiff's monetary recovery in this case must be
much more limited in scope.
30.

Plaintiff could have remained as a senior manager

at Price Waterhouse and received significantly higher
compensation than she received from her consulting business or
the World Bank.

Approximately 19 Price Waterhouse senior

managers presently earn in excess of $150,000 per year.

1990

Tr. at 214.
31.

In 1984, there was a demand for management

consultants in plaintiff's area of expertise at Big Eight
accounting firms, large independent consulting firms and within
divisions of companies.

1990 Tr. at 285.

The national and

Washington D.C. job markets for persons in the field of
management consulting, including the large computer system
specialty area of plaintiff, have grown dramatically since
then .

.Id. at 280-81.
32.

Consulting firms and companies place a premium on

maturity, experience, project management ability, and business
development skills; plaintiff's previous experience at Touche
Ross and Price Waterhouse would have been a distinct advantage
in her search for a new position.

1990 Tr. at 282; i..!;l. at

288-89.
33.

Based upon the testimony of an expert in the

employment opportunities available in plaintiff's field during
the years 1983 and thereafter, in January 1984 plaintiff could
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have found a ~omparable position at or above her Price
Waterhouse salary of $70,000 in three to six months.
Tr. at 284.
34.

1990

S e e ~ .iJi. at 304-06, 331-32.
In addition to Big Eight accounting firms,

plaintiff could have sought employment at approximately "50
very large consulting firms, most of whom have large systems
1990 Tr. at 289.

consulting businesses."

At least 30 of

those firms have offices in the Washington, D.C. area.

Id.

There are many specialized systems consulting firms for whom
plaintiff could have worked including large vendors of software
and hardware .
35.

.l.d.
Touche Ross expressed specific interest in

plaintiff (1990 Tr. at 178-81) and other Big Eight firms such
as Arthur Andersen and Peat Marwick & Mitchell as well as major
management consulting firms like Booz Allen were looking for
persons with plaintiff's , skills in 1984 .

--,

.Id. at 286.

Such

firms were paying $80,000 and up for experienced systems
consultants; consulting practices were growing and industry was

-------

-

~

installing larger and more comPl_ex computers systems.

Id~ at

287.
36.

Plaintiff could have obtained such a position in

1984 and, had she performed successfully, she would likely be
making close to $200,000 today.
37.

1990 Tr. at 287.

Plaintiff's failure to make partner at Price

Waterhouse would not significantly have hindered her efforts to
find a comparable new position.

1990 Tr. at 287-88.

\
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It would

not have precluded executive recruiters from attempting to
place plaintiff.

_N. at 288.

It is understood within the

industry that partnership selection involves many factors and
firms look at an individual's talents and circumstances and do
not reject or discount an individual simply because an
applicant did not become a partner at a Big Eight firm.

Id. at

287-88.

38.

The mere fact that plaintiff filed a lawsuit

against Price Waterhouse would not have been a significant
obstacle to plaintiff's efforts to find a satisfactory
position.

1990 Tr. a t 288, 291.
39.

Plaintiff's age in 1984 would not have been a

disadvantage in her efforts to seek employment comparable to
the position she sought at Price Waterhouse.
Tr. at 288-89;
40.

1990

id. at 309.
There is great mobility in the accounting

profession and senior staff are able to move from one firm to
another with relative ease.
320.

~Def.Ex. A7; 1990 Tr. at 224,

A survey conducted by Price Waterhouse of its offices~/

in 1987 revealed that, during the period 1980-87, many Price
Waterhouse employees (both male and female) whose partnership

~/ Plaintiff mistakenly characterizes this as a "survey of all
senior professionals who left its employ in the period
1980 - 87." Pl. Proposed Findings 1 S(d). However, Price
Waterhouse merely attempted to identify instances of employees
who had left the firm and become partners of other firms. 1990
Tr. at 207-08. The survey was not intended to be and was not
represented to be comprehensive.
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candidacies had not borne fruit, as well employees who were not
even nominated for partnership, were able to leave Price
Waterhouse and become partners at other Big Eight accounting
firms.

~

Def. Ex. A7; 1990 Tr. at 183-85, 192-225.

This

evidence demonstrates that comparable positions were available
for plaintiff.
41.

Plaintiff's efforts to find a suitable position

with a major consulting firm were deficient.

1990 Tr. at 307.

Plaintiff failed to seek to find a new position through
executive search organizations.

Id.

The ordinary practice is

to send lette rs and resumes to such organizations, which amass
a data bank from which to search for individuals to fill
positions for their 'clients .

.Id. at 303-05; li. at 294-95.

Plaintiff should have sent resumes and letters to 200 or more
executive search firms if she was interested in positions
nationwide (id. at 302, 307), and 50 to 60 if she was looking
in Washington D.C. only .
42.

.Id. at 302.

Plaintiff testified that she sent letters and

resumes to no more than four executive recruiters.
able to produce documentation of any such contacts.

She was not
1990

Tr. at '61.
43.

Had plaintiff been made a Price Waterhouse

partner, she would have been subject to being transferred to a
different city.

Price Waterhouse partners ar~ regularly

requested to transfer to a new office location, and are
expected to do so.

1990 Tr. at 239-41.

One-third of each new

partnership class is required to transfer.

- 13 -

Id. at 242 ·.

44.

Although plaintiff stated that she was willing to

relocate to another city after she left Price Waterhouse, 1990
Tr. at 62-63, she did not interview with potential employers in
any city outside of Washington, D.C.
45.

Id. at 62.

Plaintiff's direct contact with potential

employers was "wholly inadequate."

1990 Tr. at 307.

A

person

in plaintiff's position should have started with a list of 30
to 50 contacts and attempted to expand that network as her job
search continued.

Id. at 308.

Plaintiff failed to take such

steps.
46.

Plaintiff's failure to apply for a position at

any of the major firms in her area of expertise cannot be
viewed as a reasonable attempt to minimize her losses.
47.

The senior manager and partner compensation

levels at other major accounting and consulting firms are and
were comparable to compensation levels for similar positions at
Price Waterhouse.

~

1990 Tr. at 186, 194-95, 205, 268,

285 - 87.

48.

Plaintiff's expert economist assumed that Price

Waterhouse would have paid plaintiff more than double what any
other firm or employer would pay.
322-23.

1990 Tr. at 144-45; .i_d. at

However, that assumption was not based upon any

research or understanding of the availability of comparable
positions for plaintiff once she left Price Waterhouse in
1984.

Id. at 144-45.

It would be extremely rare for one firm

to place a value on the services of an individual that so

-
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greatly exceeds the individual's value in the marketplace.

lQ.

at 323.
49.

While plaintiff of course had the option to try

another type of endeavor, she cannot reasonably expect Price
Waterhouse to subsidize her for the differential resulting from
the lower compensation to be expected as a sole proprietor or
salaried employee in a civil service type position.

The Court

finds the assumption that plaintiff's self-employment income
and her income from the World Bank was "the best she [could]
do," 1990 Tr. at 144-45, to be unreasonable.
322-23.

~

id. at

Had plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence, she

could have obtained a consulting position that offered
opportunities and compensation comparable to a Price Waterhouse
partnership by June 30, 1984.

Thus, assuming Price Waterhouse

is liable under Title VII, plaintiff's monetary recovery must
be limited to the difference between the income of a beginning
Price Waterhouse partner and the amount plaintiff actually
earned for the period July 1, 1983 through June 30, 1984.
50.

The appropriate interest rate to be applied to

any award of back pay is 5.6\.
51.

1990 Tr. at 341.

As a matter of policy and equity, front pay

should not be awarded for any period longer than the amount of
time necessary for plaintiff to find employment at a comparable
compensation level.

Front pay should not be a sinecure.

Moreover, providing plaintiff with lifetime partnership income
would serve as a continuing disincentive to plaintiff to obtain

- 15 -

a position in the future that provides opportunities for
advancement and compensation similar to a partnership at the
Price Waterhouse firm.

In addition, plaintiff testified that

she believes she is presently qualified to perform as a partner
at any other Big Eight firm, 1990 Tr. at 75, and if plaintiff
did seek and obtain a position more lucrative than the one she
now holds, she would be put in a better position than she would
have enjoyed had she been made a partner in Price Waterhouse in
1983.

Such a result is directly antithetical to the remedial

goals of Title VII.
52.

Even if plaintiff had taken reasonable steps to

mitigate, the Court finds that her projections of front pay
were highly speculative and too uncertain to permit an award of
front pay in this case.
53.

In projecting the future profitability of Price

Waterhouse, plaintiff's expert did not conduct any inquiry into
the economic future of the accounting profession, 1990 Tr. at
127-28, 150, although he acknowledged the •uncertainty about
the accounting industry . . . as a whole.•

.Ig.

at 128.

However, the Court accepts Mr. Connor's testimony that changes
in the profession in recent years have made the business
environment extremely risky, unpredictable, and uncertain.
at 256-61.
54.

Id.

See also id. at 348-49.
The Price Waterhouse partner share value has

increased only about 5.4\ since 1984 (approximately 1\ a
year).

Plaintiff's expert's projection of a 34.8\ share value

- 16 -

increase in the first 5 years of the 1990's is unsupportable.
I.d, at 164-66, 348-49.

55.

~Def.Ex. Al8.

Plaintiff's expert also assumed that, if

plaintiff had made partner in 1983, she would have stayed with
the firm for 21 years, until she retired at age 60 in 2004.
Pl. Ex. A3.

How~ver, he offered no explanation for this

assumption, 1990 Tr. at 113-14, and admitted that this
assumption was "not based on any specific information."
116; id. at 146-47.

I.d, at

Plaintiff did not testify that she would

have remained with Price Waterhouse for the duration of her
career and the Court has no reason to believe that she would
have done so.

In fact, 10 of the 47 partners in plaintiff's

class of 1983 have already left the firm.

Id. at 215.

Furthermore, the partner attrition rate at Price Waterhouse has
increased steadily over the last decade .
56.
allocation.

.IJl.

Partner compensation is directly related to share
1990 Tr. at 237.

Shares are allocated each year

on the basis of the results of a yearly partner performance
review process.

If a partner is not performing to expected

levels, shares will be allocated accordingly; if a partner has
a serious technical, productivity or other problem, such as an
"inability to relate to clients, to staff," shares may be
reduced or the partner might be asked to leave the firm.
Id. at 239.
57.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that it

is unreasonable to assume plaintiff would have remained with
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the firm for 21 years and it would be highly speculative and
improper to require Price Waterhouse to pay plaintiff "front
pay" based on that assumption.
58.

Price Waterhouse presently has in effect two

alternative retiring partner agreements; a "fixed income"
agreement, Def. Ex. A3, and a "variable profit-sharing"
agreement.

Def. Ex. A2; see 1990 Tr. at 150.

59.

The retirement benefits under both agreements are

unvested and unfunded.

1990 Tr. at 255-56.

Thus, if a partner

leaves the firm prior to age 55, that partner is entitled to no
benefits.

Id. at 256.

In addition, if the firm becomes

insolvent, no benefits are paid to retired partners .

.I.d.

Furthermore, the aggregate retirement benefits that can be paid
in any one year are limited to 15\ of that year's profits.

~

Def. Ex. A2-A3.
60.

These elements add significant uncertainties to

any calculation of retirement benefits, yet plaintiff's expert
failed to take then into account in estimating such benefits.
And retirement benefits account for more than 50\ of the
undiscounted losses projected by plaintiff's expert.

~

1990

Tr. at 150-60.
61.

Plaintiff's front pay calculations assume she

would have chosen the variable retirement benefits because,
based upon plaintiff's projections, they would have been
significantly more valuable than the fixed benefits.
at 152.

1990 Tr.

However, the projections of the variable benefits are

-
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inherently more speculative, requiring predictions of the
future profitability of Price Waterhouse until 2025, as opposed
to 2004 using the fixed benefits alternative.

Id. at 156.

Furthermore, partners who choose the fixed benefits are
afforded more freedom to continue working for other firms and
companies once they leave Price Waterhouse than individuals who
choose the variable benefits.
153.

Def. Ex. A2-A3; 1990 Tr. at

The fixed benefits also afford greater certainty to the

partner than the variable .

.Id. at 246.

And an increasing

number of partners have in fact chosen fixed, rather than
variable, benefits.
62.

Id. at 244-45.

Plaintiff did not establish with sufficient

certainty that she would have remained at Price Waterhouse
until retirement at age 60 or what, if any, retirement benefits
she would have received if she had made partner in 1983.
63.

In discounting plaintiff's projected future

losses to present value, plaintiff's expert used a nontaxable
interest rate of 5.8\.

1990 Tr. at 142.

The Court finds that

this 5.8\ discount rate is unjustifiably low and
inappropriate.

The current nontaxable interest rate is 7.2\

and it averaged over 9\ during the 1980's.

Indeed, plaintiff's

expert applied these much higher interest rates to adjust
plaintiff's back pay award, but not to discount the projections
of future losses.

Id. at 149, 340-41.

Moreover, given the

substantial uncertainties in the accounting profession, the
unlimited personal liability of partners and the difficulty of

- 19 -

.,

obtaining insurance to cover the firm's potential liabilitie s
(1990 Tr. at 245-46, 256-61), even these higher interest rates
for risk free investmen ts appear too low.

No reasonabl e

investor would purchase the right to the future income stream
of a Price Waterhous e partner in light of these risks unless a
substanti ally higher rate of interest was applied to the
investmen t.

See 1990 Tr. at 346-48.

Plaintiff has failed to

provide the Court with a reasonably certain discounte d figure
for future projection s of partnersh ip income.
64.

The plaintiff 's front pay calculatio ns do not

allow the Court to determine with reasonabl e certainty the
amount or present value of any future losses.
65.

Price Waterhous e has taken action to ensure that

partnersh ip decisions are made on a fair and equitable basis
and in a nondiscrim inatory atmospher e.

1990 Tr. at 254-55.

Because the firm has itself already acted to cure any defective
elements in its partner selection process, and because
plaintiff has offered no evidence of the kind of historica l,
callous and intention al discrimin ation that justifies
injunctive or affirmativ e relief, the Court finds that it is
unnecessa ry to exercise any form of continuing supervisio n over
the partnersh ip.

Moreover, the Court has declined to grant

specific relief, such as partnersh ip admission ; therefore ,
plaintiff 's request for an injunction regulating the firm in
the future is moot.
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Wa shi ngt on, D.C . 200 36
(20 2) 955 -85 00

w.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
Defendant's Proposed Findings of Fact on Remedial Issues to be
served by hand delivery this 20th day of April 1990, upon James
H. Heller, Esq., Kator, Scott & Heller, 1275 K Street, N.W.,
Suite 950, Washington, D.C. 20006.

~4c-.B~/.
Theodore J. outrous, J{.
{D.C. Bar No. 420444)
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER
1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Suite 900
Washington, D.C. 20036
{202) 955-8500
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